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ABSTRACT
We study how stock market mispricing might influence individual firms' investment decisions. We
find a positive relation between investment and a number of proxies for mispricing, controlling for
investment opportunities and financial slack, suggesting that overpriced (underpriced) firms tend
to overinvest (underinvest). Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that investment
is more sensitive to our mispricing proxies for firms with higher R&D intensity suggesting longer
periods of information asymmetry and thus mispricing) or share turnover (suggesting that the firms'
shareholders are short-term investors). We also find that firms with relatively high (low) investment
subsequently have relatively low (high) stock returns, after controlling for investment opportunities
and other characteristics linked to return predictability. These patterns are stronger for firms with
higher R&D intensity or higher share turnover.
Christopher Polk











paola-sapienza@northwestern.eduThe market eﬃciency hypothesis states that security prices always fully reﬂect available
information. Over the last decade that paradigm has come under attack. Shleifer (2000),
Barberis and Thaler (2001), and Hirshleifer (2001) summarize three related strands of literature.
First, theoretical work argues that arbitrage has limited eﬀectiveness. Second, experimental
evidence shows that agents hold beliefs that are not completely correct and/or make choices
that are normatively questionable. Finally, empirical work documents phenomena where prices
almost certainly deviate from fundamental value.
This body of evidence in support of behavioral ﬁnance naturally raises the question as to
whether mispricing in the stock market has consequences for the real economy. Without such
an impact, these behavioral anomalies may just represent an interesting sideshow.
An obvious starting point for such a line of inquiry is to ask whether market ineﬃciencies
impact managerial decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that when a ﬁrm’s stock price
is high, the ﬁrm is more likely to issue equity rather than debt. This behavior has a large,
persistent eﬀect on ﬁrm capital structure.
An interesting related question is whether deviation from fundamentals can inﬂuence ﬁrms’
investment policy. Stein (1996) examines ﬁrm investment in the presence of market ineﬃ-
ciencies. In his analysis, Stein shows that the mechanism through which market ineﬃciencies
aﬀect investment decisions are diﬀerent depending on whether the managers have long or short
horizons.
If managers have long horizons and discount project cash ﬂow at the true cost of capital (i.e.
based on fundamental risks), a manager can issue overvalued stock or buy back undervalued
equity consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002). Investment decisions may change as a result
of this capital structure decision. Stein shows that equity-dependent ﬁrms will have investment
that is more sensitive to non-fundamental variations in stock prices than ﬁrms that are not
liquidity constrained. When stock prices are above fundamentals, rational managers of equity-
dependent ﬁrms ﬁnd it more attractive to issue equity. By contrast, when stock prices are
below fundamental values, managers of equity-dependent ﬁrms do not invest, because for them
investment requires the issuance of stock at too low of a price. In summary, stock price valuations
can aﬀect investment through an equity-issuance channel. According to this theory irrational
1ﬂuctuations in a ﬁrm’s stock market price are an important determinant of investment for the
subset of ﬁrms that are equity-dependent, but are a sideshow for ﬁrms that are not. The real
eﬀect of investors’ sentiment is to enable good (i.e. positive net present value) projects that
otherwise would not occur.
Baker and Wurgler (2002)’s evidence on the timing of equity issues is consistent with the
importance of such a mechanism but does not provide direct evidence that deviation from
fundamentals can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s real investment decision. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) do
directly test Stein (1996) and ﬁnd evidence that stock prices have a stronger inﬂuence on the
investment of ﬁrms that need external equity to ﬁnance their investments.
This literature concludes that stock market mispricing has an impact on ﬁrm’s investment
through equity-decision. In this paper we ask a complementary question, whether there is an
alternative direct channel that aﬀects investment decisions that is not linked to equity issuance
decisions. Stein (1996) provides a positive theoretical answer to this question. In his paper
Stein also studies the case where managers have short horizons. In that circumstance, managers
discount project cash ﬂows at the actual conditional expected return on the ﬁrm’s assets. Since
markets are ineﬃcient, this will not necessarily be the cost of capital as predicted by a model
of fundamental risks. As Stein points out, one way of thinking about this situation is that a
short-horizons manager is interested in maximizing the current stock price and thus must cater
to any misperceptions investors may have.
In this paper we test this alternative (and complementary) catering channel through which
deviation from fundamentals may aﬀect investment decisions directly. If new investment
projects are evaluated at the current stock market price, for example as in the practice of
using “multiples” to evaluate new projects, and if there is enough asymmetry of information
regarding project quality, a rational manager may ﬁnd it optimal to invest in projects with
negative NPV even when the project is not ﬁnanced with equity issues. Firms with ample cash
or debt capacity may have an incentive to waste resources when their stock price is overpriced
and to forgo positive investment opportunities when their stock price is undervalued. Thus
mispricing may aﬀect investment without working through an equity channel as in Baker, Stein,
and Wurgler (2003).
2We believe that this alternative mechanism has the potential to be quite important since
retained earnings are the overwhelming source of ﬁnance (see Mayer (1988) and Rajan and
Zingales (1995), for example). Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) claim that “Indeed, on
average, less than two percent of all corporate ﬁnancing comes from the external equity market.”
More recently, Mayer and Sussman (2003) analyze the source of ﬁnancing of large investments for
U.S. companies. They ﬁnd that most large investments are ﬁnanced by new debt and retained
earnings. Because seasoned equity oﬀerings are rarely used to ﬁnance investments, we believe it
is important to assess whether ﬁrms change their investment policies depending on the valuation
of their stock even if they are not issuing equity to ﬁnance these investments.
Furthermore, this alternative mechanism has very diﬀerent implications for the types of in-
vestments chosen. Managers with long horizons make eﬃcient investment decisions by assump-
tion. Alternatively, if stock market valuation aﬀects investment decision through a catering
channel, managers may take investment that have negative net present value (and avoid invest-
ment that has positive net present value) as long as this strategy increases stock price in the
short-run.
We ﬁrst build on the intuition in Stein’s short-horizons model in order to develop a very sim-
ple framework in which to analyze the optimal investment decision of a manager of a mispriced
company that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. This framework allows us to generate some
testable empirical predictions. For example, we show that misallocation of investment capital
is more likely to occur when the expected duration of mispricing is long and shareholders have
short investment horizons.
The challenging task in testing the hypothesis that stock market mispricing aﬀects invest-
ment decision is to ﬁnd a good proxy for mispricing. Our analysis critically depends on identi-
fying situations where ﬁrms are mispriced. The problem with that identiﬁcation is the classic
joint hypothesis problem of Fama (1970). Predictable movements in price may just as well be
a result of compensation for risk as a consequence of bias in investors’ expectations.
We therefore rely on three diﬀerent proxies for stock mispricing – discretionary accruals, net
equity issuances/repurchases, and price momentum. Several papers provide evidence that these
variables are good predictors of subsequent returns. Thus, we use these variables to measure
3the extent to which a stock is “mispriced.” The literature’s justiﬁcation of why these three
variables might be related to mispricing relies on diﬀerent conjectures as to how investors form
beliefs and diﬀerent hypotheses explaining deviations from market eﬃciency. For this reason, we
analyze the impact of each one of these measures separately and then study the overall impact
when combined together into a summary “mispricing metric” produced from a ﬁrm-level vector
autoregression.
Our ﬁrst proxy, discretionary accruals, attempts to measure the extent to which the ﬁrm has
abnormal non-cash earnings. Firms with high discretionary accruals have relatively low stock
returns in the future (see Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Sloan (1996)) suggesting that
they are overpriced. One possible explanation for this relation is that discretionary accruals may
measure the extent of earnings manipulation. For example, if investors are not sophisticated
enough, a manager facing lower than expected sales could book a high level of accounts receivable
today in order to keep stock prices high. Evidence shows that, though investors focus on
earnings, they fail to distinguish between the accrual and cash ﬂow components (see Hand
(1990) and Maines and Hand (1996)).
Several papers present evidence on stock price drift following seasoned equity issues, repur-
chases, dividends initiations (see Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Loughran and
Ritter (1997), and Michaely et al. (1995)). This evidence is interpreted as evidence of investors’
underreaction to news or events. Recently, Daniel and Titman (2001) construct a measure of
net equity issuance that combines ﬁrm’s equity issuance and repurchase activity with dividend
initiation and omission. They show that ﬁrms with high net equity issuance in the past ﬁve
years have subsequent low stock returns in the next year suggesting that they are overpriced.
Based on this evidence, we use net equity issuance in the past ﬁve years as our second mispricing
proxy.
Our third measure exploits the ﬁrm and industry momentum documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). According to this research, yearly excess
returns at either the ﬁrm or industry level exhibit positive serial correlation. Also, Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993, 2001) document long-term reversal of momentum proﬁts. A portion of this
literature has interpreted momentum as overreaction to private information, implying long-run
4negative autocorrelation. This interpretation explains the serial correlation of excess returns as
a ﬁrm’s stock price moving away from its fundamental price (overreaction). Consistent with
this interpretation, we use lagged momentum as our third proxy for mispricing.
Our main test estimates ﬁrm-level investment on the mispricing proxies described above,
controlling for investment opportunities, measured by Tobin’s Q. Using Tobin’s Q may be
problematic in this context for several reasons. First, measured Q may itself be a function of
the bubble (see Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2002)). If
managers indeed respond to stock market mispricing and Q reﬂects in part some of the deviations
from fundamentals, the coeﬃcients on our mispricing proxies are biased downward. Therefore
even if we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between our mispricing proxies and investment, we
cannot conclude that the market is a sideshow, because some of the eﬀect of mispricing may be
captured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, if we do ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relation between our
mispricing proxies and investment, our coeﬃcients in all likelihood understate the eﬀect.
Second, the existence of measurement error in Tobin’s Q further complicates our our analysis
if our mispricing variable is a good indicator of unobserved investment opportunities. Therefore,
we explicitly address this problem through the use of several potential solutions suggested by
previous research.
We ﬁnd a positive relation between all of these three mispricing proxies and ﬁrm investment.
Our results are robust to several alternative speciﬁcations as well as to corrections for measure-
ment error in our measure for investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q. In agreement with the
predictions of our model, we also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher R&D intensity and share turnover
have investment that is more sensitive to all three types of mispricing.
We summarize these results by estimating a ﬁrm-level vector autoregression (VAR) which
includes our three mispricing proxies as well as estimates of CAPM beta. The VAR’s forecasts
of future returns and risks produces a mispricing metric. We ﬁnd that investment moves pos-
itively with this measure. Overall, these results provide evidence that our mispricing proxies
and ﬁrm investment are positively correlated. But they do not provide direct evidence that
overpriced ﬁrms take investment projects that have negative net present values. To address
this point, we analyze the relationship between investment and future stock returns. If ﬁrms
5are misallocating resources due to market misvaluation, abnormal investment should predict
risk-adjusted returns. We estimate cross-sectional regressions of future monthly stock returns
on current investment, controlling for investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and ﬁnancial slack.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high (low) investment have low (high) stock returns, after controlling
for investment opportunities and other characteristics linked to return predictability.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature. In section II we
motivate our empirical work by detailing a simple model of ﬁrm investment. We describe the
data and report the results in section III. Section IV concludes.
I Related literature
Researchers have long known that stock prices contain information about real investment. A
broader question concerns the exact nature of this relation. Perhaps the best known description
of that relation is “Q” theory. Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969) propose that a ﬁrm
will invest until Q = 1 where Q is deﬁned as the ratio between the stock-market valuation of
existing real capital assets and their current replacement cost. That theory explicitly depends
on “the values of existing capital goods, or of titles to them, to diverge from their current
reproduction cost.” Clearly, that divergence can be due to mispricing.
In most of the subsequent theoretical literature, researchers assume that ﬁnancial markets are
eﬃcient. In particular, models by Abel (1980) and Hayashi (1982) focus on marginal adjustment
costs that prevent Q from equaling 1. Thus investment should be related to the ﬁrm’s marginal
Q. If asset pricing is rational, the stock market appropriately values the average Q of this out-of-
steady-state outcome. As a consequence, a majority of empirical research explains investment
with Tobin’s Q. To the extent that the relation between Q and investment is weak, most
researchers have looked to the twin problems of asymmetric information and agency without
abandoning the eﬃcient market hypothesis. See Stein (2001) for a survey of this literature.
However, several researchers have deserted the eﬃcient markets assumption in this context.
Abel and Blanchard (1986) argues that stock market ineﬃciencies might explain the weak per-
formance of Q-theory. If markets are ineﬃcient, deviation from fundamental values is random
error that smears information in average Q concerning a ﬁrm’s marginal investment oppor-
6tunities. This skepticism concerning the equivalence of price and fundamentals has no real
consequences. Abel and Blanchard (1986) presumes that managers ignore this noise and invest
optimally. Only the econometrician is inconvenienced.
Some researchers have considered the possibility that ineﬃcient capital markets may actually
aﬀect corporate investment policies. The literature on this topic has provided mixed evidence.
Merton and Fisher (1984) show that investment decisions should respond to stock price changes,
even when the stock market ﬂuctuates irrationally. They also provide evidence that stock prices
can forecast aggregate investment expenditures. Barro (1990) shows that stock market variables
retain signiﬁcant predictive power for investment, even after controlling for contemporaneous
and lagged values of after-tax corporate proﬁts. Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1990) also ﬁnd
that returns can predict growth rates of investment. However, when they control for lagged
growth rates of proﬁts and sales as reasonable proxies for fundamentals, the predictive power
disappears. They conclude that “the market may not be a complete sideshow, but nor is it
very central.” Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) reach a similar conclusion using diﬀerent
proxies for fundamentals and the stock market.
Chirinko and Schaller (2001) ﬁnd diﬀerent results using aggregate Japanese data. They
argue for a bubble in Japanese equity markets during the period 1987-89 that boosted business
ﬁxed investment by approximately 6-9%. Their ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that
the additional investment was ﬁnanced with equity. As described above, Baker, Stein, and
Wurgler (2003) test the proposition in the model of Stein (1996) that the investment of equity-
dependent ﬁrms will respond more to the stock market than the investment of less-constrained
ﬁrms. To measure equity dependence, they use the “KZ” index in Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
Using Tobin’s q as a proxy for equity value, they conﬁrm their hypothesis that the sensitivity
of investment to variation in stock market price is greater for equity-dependent ﬁrms.
II Investment decisions
In this section we follow Stein (1996) and provide intuition as to why stock price deviations from
fundamental value may have a direct eﬀect on the investment policy of the ﬁrm. The particular
aspect of his model we exploit does not require that the ﬁrm issue equity to ﬁnance investments.
7Because the empirical evidence shows that ﬁrms generally do not ﬁnance new investments with
equity issues we think this is a sensible avenue to explore.
Consider a ﬁrm that uses capital, K at time 0 to produce output. K is continuous and
homogenous with price c. The true value of the ﬁrm at time t is V (K). The market value of
ﬁrm at time t is V mkt(K) = (1 + αt)V (K) where αt measures the extent to which the ﬁrm is
mispriced. The ﬁrm misvaluation depends on some level of mispricing α and on the probability
that the quality of the investment project is fully revealed. This discovery process follows a
Poisson process with mean arrival rate p ∈ (0,+∞). Therefore, αt = αe−t.
We assume that shareholders may have short horizons. Speciﬁcally, each shareholder j will
need liquidity at some point in time, t+u, where u is distributed according to a Poisson process
with mean arrival rate qj ∈ [0,∞). A small qj suggests that particular shareholder is a long-term
shareholder that intends to sell his stocks many years after the initial investment. A short-term
investor has a large qj.1





(1 + αe−pt)qe−qjtV (K)dt − (K − K0)c (1)
Current shareholders’ expected level of income is a weighted average of the share price before
and after the true value of the company is revealed.2 Equation (1) shows that the expected
level of income of the shareholders will depend on how likely the shareholder is to receive a
liquidity shock before the true value of the company is incorporated into stock prices. Assume
that managers maximize the wealth of the average existing shareholder. Denote q as the mean
arrival rate of the mean shareholder. The larger q is (more impatient investors on average),
the higher the weight on the informationally-ineﬃcient share price. The larger p is (a ﬁrm
with projects of shorter maturity), the higher the weight on the share price under symmetric
information. The FOC of the manager’s problem is the following:
1We assume that the manager is rational, maximizes shareholders’ wealth, and that the shareholders are
myopic. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption in Stein (1996) that managers are myopic. Also, Stein
(1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990) model myopia.





where γ ≡ 1 +
αq
q+p. The optimal investment level, K∗ when there is no mis-pricing (α = 0)
satisﬁes V 0(K∗) = c. When the ﬁrm is overpriced (α is high), the manager invests more than
K∗. Even if the marginal value from the investment is lower than the cost of investing, the
market’s tendency to overvalue the investment project may more than compensate for the loss
from the value-destroying investment. In other words, the overvaluation of the project more
than compensates for the “punishment” the market imposes on the ﬁrm at time when the ﬁrm
becomes correctly priced.
The incentive to overinvestment increases with the expected duration of the mispricing (small
p) and decreases with the horizon of the average shareholder (high q). Intuitively, if current
overvaluations are expected to last and if investors are short-term, managers increase investment
to take advantage of the mispricing.
Similarly, underinvestment occurs when ﬁrms are underpriced. If the market is pessimistic
about the value of the ﬁrm (α is negative), the manager will invest too little. The level of
investment will be lower as the expected duration of the mispricing (small p) increases and/or
the horizon of the average shareholder (high q) shortens.3
III Empirical analysis
A Data
Most of our data comes from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database, made available to
us through Wharton Research Data Services. Our sample includes ﬁrms over the period 1963-
2000. We ignore ﬁrms with negative accounting numbers for book assets, capital, or investment.
When explaining investment, we study only December ﬁscal year-end ﬁrms to eliminate the usual
problems caused by the use of overlapping observations. We drop ﬁrms with sales less than 10
million, and extreme observations (details in the appendix).
3Our modeling of the expected duration of mispricing is quite stylized. A more in-depth analysis of the
interaction between asymmetrric information and mispricing, as modeled in a previous version of the paper, is
available upon request.
9We intersect the initial sample with the Zacks database. That database provides analyst
consensus estimates of earnings one, two, and ﬁve years out. We use the Spectrum database to
calculate the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions. Table 1 reports summary
statistics for our sample of ﬁrms.
B Methodology
Throughout the paper, we estimate linear models of ﬁrm investment. A very large previous
literature has studied the properties of that central ﬁrm decision.4 Our typical speciﬁcation
regresses ﬁrm investment on a proxy for mispricing, on a proxy for Tobin’s Q, and on ﬁrm cash
ﬂow, controlling for ﬁrm (fi) and year (γt) ﬁxed eﬀects:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1




The dependent variable is individual ﬁrms’ investment-capital ratios (
Ii,t
Ki,t−1) where invest-
ment, Ii,t, is capital expenditure and capital, Ki,t−1, is beginning-of-year net property, plant,
and equipment. Tobin’s Q, Qi,t−1 is beginning of period market-to-book.
Market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock
less the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2
equals the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation over beginning-of-year
capital.
Our analysis critically depends on identifying situations where ﬁrms are mispriced (α). The
problem with that identiﬁcation is the classic joint hypothesis problem of Fama (1970). Pre-
dictable movements in price may just as well be a result of compensation for risk as a consequence
of bias in investors’ expectations. The model of market equilibrium is what distinguishes those
two possibilities: one researcher’s anomaly is another researcher’s risk factor.
As a consequence, we identify mispricing in the capital markets using three diﬀerent mea-
sures. These measures operate through diﬀerent channels: ﬁrm opaqueness / information dis-
tortion, slow incorporation of information, and overreaction to ﬁrm stock performance. The key
characteristic that all three measures have in common is that they are linked to cross-sectional
4See Stein (2001) for a recent summary of that literature.
10patterns in average returns that are not well explained by asset-pricing models.
C Discretionary accruals and investments
Accruals represent the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s accounting earnings and its underlying cash
ﬂow. For example, large positive accruals indicate that earnings are much higher than the cash
ﬂow generated by the ﬁrm. Our ﬁrst proxy relies on the evidence that ﬁrms that have atypically
high accruals have low subsequent stock returns. Accruals (ACCRi,t) are measured by
ACCR(i,t) = ∆NCCA − ∆CL − DEP
where ∆NCCA is the change in non-cash current assets. ∆CL is the change in current
liabilities minus the change in debt included in current liabilities and minus the change in income
taxes payable. DEP is depreciation and amortization. See Sloan (1996) for more discussion of
earning accruals.
The diﬀerences between earnings and cash ﬂow arise because of accounting conventions as to
when, and how much, revenues and costs are recognized. Within those conventions, managers
have discretion over accruals adjustments and may use them in order to manage earnings.5 In
principle, if investors can detect earnings manipulation, higher accruals should not aﬀect the
stock price. However, a large body of evidence shows that though investors focus on earnings,
they fail to distinguish between the accrual and cash ﬂow components (see Hand (1990) and
Maines and Hand (1996)).
In order to distinguish earning-manipulation from the non-discretionary component of ac-
cruals, the literature has focused on discretionary accruals, deﬁned as those accruals which are
abnormal given ﬁrm characteristics, relative to the past tendencies of the ﬁrm, and/or compared
with other ﬁrms in the same industry. Several papers show a strong correlation between dis-
cretionary accruals and subsequent stock returns, suggesting that ﬁrms with high discretionary
accruals are overpriced ﬁrms relative to otherwise similar ﬁrms.
For example, Sloan (1996) ﬁnds that those ﬁrms with relatively high (low) levels of abnor-
5For example, a manager can modify accruals by delaying recognition of expenses after cash is advanced to
suppliers, by advancing recognition of revenues with credit sales, by decelerating depreciation, or by assuming a
low provision for bad debt.
11mal accruals experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns concentrated around
future earning announcements. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) ﬁnd that ﬁrms issuing
secondary equity and IPO ﬁrms who have the highest discretionary accruals have the lowest ab-
normal returns. More recently, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2001) also investigates
the relation between discretionary accruals and stock returns. Conﬁrming previous results, they
ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high (low) discretionary accruals do poorly (well) over the subsequent year.
Most of the abnormal performance is concentrated in the ﬁrms with very high discretionary
accruals.
We use this past evidence on the correlation between discretionary accruals and stock returns
to justify the use of discretionary accruals as our ﬁrst mispricing proxy. We construct this
component of accruals using the cross-sectional adaptation developed in Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998a, 1998b) of the modiﬁed Jones (1991) model. Speciﬁcally, we estimate normal accruals
for each ﬁrm in a given year by estimating the following cross-sectional regression for the ﬁrm’s

















We then apply these estimates to the ﬁrm under consideration.6















Note that as in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), before applying the estimates, we
ﬁrst subtract the increase in accounts receivable from sales to allow for the manipulation of






We have also estimated discretionary accruals using the approach of Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh,
6We require that a ﬁrm has 25 two-digit SIC code peers.
12and Lakonishok (2001). All our results are substantially the same when we use this alternative
measure as well as when we replace contemporaneous observations with lagged versions of either
measure.
We estimate the basic regression:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1




Column (1) of Table 2, Panel A displays the results of regression (4). Controlling for investment
opportunities and cash ﬂow, ﬁrms with high discretionary accruals invest more. The coeﬃcient
of investment on discretionary accruals measures 0.1266 with an associated t-statistic of 7.32.
Firms with abnormally soft earnings invest more than the standard model would indicate.
This eﬀect is economically important. A typical (one-standard deviation) change in a typical
ﬁrm’s level of discretionary accruals is associated with roughly a two percent change in that
ﬁrm’s investment as a percentage of capital. Recall that Abel and Blanchard (1986) suggests
that mispricing may smear the information in Q concerning investment opportunities. This
possibility actually works against us ﬁnding any independent eﬀect of discretionary accruals.
If Q is correlated with mispricing, the coeﬃcient of discretionary accruals underestimates the
eﬀect of mispricing on investment.
There are several potential problems in our baseline regression that might undermine the
interpretation of the results. The most obvious arises from the fact that the disappointing
performance of our measure of Q, even if consistent with the results in the rest of the literature,
suggests that this measure may be a poor proxy for true marginal Q.7
The existence of measurement error in Tobin’s Q is a problem in our analysis if our mis-
pricing variable is a good indicator of unobserved investment opportunities. For example, one
7Several papers have address this issue and found diﬀerent results. For example, Abel and Blanchard (1986)
construct aggregate marginal Q and ﬁnd little support for the view that the low explanatory power of average
Q is because it is a poor proxy for marginal Q. Similarly, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) exploit Abel and
Blanchard’s technique at the level of the individual ﬁrm. Though their marginal Q series seems to perform
better than Tobin’s Q, their qualitative results are not very diﬀerent from the previous literature. Of course,
their results critically depend on the quality of the alternative measure used. In a recent paper, Erickson and
Whited (2000) point out that the alternative measures generally used in the literature may also be ﬂawed by
similar errors-in-variables problems and suggest an alternative solution. Erickson and Whited use a measurement
error-consistent generalized method of moments estimator that relies on information in higher moments of Q.
With this estimator, they ﬁnd that the accepted results in the previous literature (low explanatory power of
Tobin’s Q and high explanatory power of cash ﬂow) disappear.
13may argue that ﬁrms with high discretionary accruals may have very proﬁtable growth options
that their average Q only partially reﬂects. These ﬁrms should invest more. Empirically, the
existing evidence suggests the opposite: ﬁrms with soft earnings are ﬁrms with poor growth
opportunities. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) document that ﬁrms with high discretionary
accruals tend to be seasoned equity issuers with relatively low post-issue net income. Chan,
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2001) show that in general ﬁrms with high discretionary
accruals subsequently have a marked deterioration in their cash ﬂows. Based on these ﬁnd-
ings, we think that it is hard to argue that the average Q for this type of ﬁrm systematically
understates marginal Q.
Even if we cannot think of any plausible reason why abnormal non-cash earnings should be
correlated with investment opportunities, we feel it is important to address measurement errors
problems in our proxy for investment opportunities. We take several diﬀerent approaches. First,
we include in our baseline regression analysts’ consensus estimate of future earnings. As long
as analysts’ forecasts are a good proxy for expected future proﬁtability, this variable should be
a good proxy for marginal Q: controlling for average Q, higher marginal Q should be positively
correlated with higher expected future proﬁtability. This correction is along the lines of the
previous literature that has focused on obtaining better measures of Q. Columns (2) through
(4) add the ratio of consensus analyst forecast of cumulative ﬁrm proﬁtability over assets one,
two, and ﬁve years out to our baseline speciﬁcation. The one-year earnings forecast has a
positive eﬀect on investment decision. The eﬀect is small, but statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level. A one-standard deviation change in one-year earning forecast is associated
with roughly a .5 percent change in that ﬁrm’s investment to capital ratio. This suggests that
this non-ﬁnancial measure of future proﬁtability has some information, even when we control
for Tobin’s Q, as suggested by previous ﬁndings (Bond and Cummins, 2000). However, the
coeﬃcient on discretionary accruals actually increases from .1266 to .1586. Moreover, the
estimate is measured with close to the same precision, even though the sample is cut almost in
half due to data limitations.
In Column (4) of Table 2-A we add both one- and two-year proﬁtability estimates to our
baseline regression. Discretionary accruals continues to be quite signiﬁcant. In Column (5)
14of Table 2-A we add one-, two-, and ﬁve-year proﬁtability forecasts. Interestingly, all three
forecasts are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level or better.8 Discretionary accruals remain
economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
We also follow Abel and Eberly (2001) and use the mean long-term consensus earning forecast
as an instrument for Q. This variable is a good instrument as long as it is not correlated with
the measurement error in Tobin’s Q. We report the results in Column (5). The magnitude and
statistical signiﬁcance of the discretionary accruals coeﬃcient is similar to our previous results
when we use instrumental variables estimation.9
The second way to deal with the measurement error problem is to follow the approach of
Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002). Those papers exploit the information contained in higher
moments to generate measurement-error consistent GMM estimators of the relation between
investment and Q.10 As in Erickson and Whited (2000), we ﬁnd that using this estimator
increases the coeﬃcient on Q by an order of magnitude.11 However, the coeﬃcient on discre-
tionary accruals remains economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Those results are available
on request.
Another potential problem with our baseline regression is that we measure average Q at
the beginning of the year in which we measure the ﬁrm’s investment. It may be the case that
over the year the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities change and as a consequence our discretionary
accruals measure is picking up this change in investment opportunities.
Therefore, in column (6) of Table 2-A, we add to the baseline speciﬁcation, end-of-period
Qi,t. Controlling for the change in Q over the investment period has no eﬀect on our result.
Investment opportunities as measured by end-of-period Tobin’s Q are not statistically signiﬁcant
and the estimated coeﬃcient is 1/5 of that on Qi,t−1 in the baseline regression. Moreover, the
estimated coeﬃcient on discretionary accruals and the statistical signiﬁcance of that estimate
8One might be initially surprised by the negative coeﬃcient on Et−1[EARNi,t+1]/Ai,t−1. However since
earnings estimates are for cumulative earnings from t − 1 to t, the negative coeﬃcient indicates that consensus
one-year earnings two years from now has a relatively smaller impact on investment than consensus one-year
earnings one-year from now. In that light, the result seems reasonable.
9Also, the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q increases and the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow decreases as in Abel and Eberly
(2001) despite the sample restrictions.
10As in Erickson and Whited (2000) we only use the estimator in those cross-sections that satisfy the identifying
assumptions concerning the information in higher moments.
11We thank Toni Whited for providing the Gauss code implementing their estimator.
15do not change.
Our controls for investment opportunities may be inadequate if there is a lag between when
a ﬁrm has investment opportunities and when the actual investment is measured. These lags
may be for such superﬁcial reasons as accounting practices or due to more fundamental sorts
of frictions. The next two speciﬁcations include lags of Q in response. In column (7), we add
Qt−2 to the speciﬁcation in column (6). Though lagged investment opportunities explain ﬁrm
investment, discretionary accruals still have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm investment.
Column (8) adds Qt−3 to our speciﬁcation. This variable is not signiﬁcant and our results do
not change. We conclude that the timing of our Tobin’s Q variable is not an issue.
Another objection to our results is that if discretionary accruals are correlated with lagged
ﬁnancial slackness, then our variable may picking up the fact that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms
have less ﬁnancial slack to invest. Of course, ﬁrms with high discretionary accruals are those
ﬁrms where earnings are not backed by cash ﬂow. Firms with high discretionary accruals have
in general little ﬁnancial slack. However, to take care of this concern we augment our baseline
regression with contemporaneous, two-years lag and three-years lag of our cash ﬂow variable,
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 as well as with measures of the cash stock. The results (unreported) are robust
to this modiﬁcation. One possible reason for ﬁrms to manipulate earnings is in order to meet
bond covenants; our results are also robust to including leverage as an additional explanatory
variable.
There might be some concern that the relation between discretionary accruals and investment
is hardwired. For example, ﬁrms with multi-year investment projects may pay for investment
in advance. When doing so, ﬁrms will book future investment as a pre-paid expense, a current
asset. As a consequence, current investment and discretionary accruals (the prepaid expense)
will exhibit a positive correlation. Presumably such a tactic would be an industry-wide prac-
tice, controlled for by the intercept in regression estimating normal accruals. Nevertheless, we
re-estimated the regression (4) measuring normal accruals using only accounts receivables in the
deﬁnition of accruals. In that regression (not reported) the coeﬃcient associated with discre-
tionary component of accounts receivable remained economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
16We conclude that this hardwired link is not driving our result. 12
Previous literature provides additional tests of our hypothesis based on sub-sample and cross-
sectional evidence. We explore these implications in Table 2, Panel B. Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (2001) as well as D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001) point out that the ability
of discretionary accruals to predict negative stock returns is concentrated in the top 20% of ﬁrms
ranked on accruals. In column (1) of Table 2-B, we add a dummy, HIGHDACCRi,t, to our
baseline discretionary accruals speciﬁcation. The dummy takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is
in the top 20% of ﬁrms based on discretionary accruals and zero otherwise. This dummy is
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) show that ﬁrms issuing equity who have the highest discre-
tionary earnings have the lowest abnormal returns. In column (2) of Table 2-B, we interact
our discretionary accruals variable with a dummy, HIGHEQISSUEi,t, that takes the value
one if the ﬁrm has an equity issuance value in the top 25 percent. We ﬁnd that the variable is
statistically signiﬁcant with an associated t-statistic of 2.84. We explore the relation between
equity issuance/repurchase activity and investment more fully in the next section.
Column (3) of Table 4-B reports our baseline discretionary accruals speciﬁcation with our
sample restricted to only Internet ﬁrms. We deﬁne Internet stocks as all the ﬁrms that were
included in the ISDEX Internet Stock Index. We identiﬁed 107 ﬁrms that belonged to the Index,
thus we have only 121 ﬁrm-years observations. As a consequence, though the point estimate of
the coeﬀcient on discretionary accruals is of the same order of magnitude as the estimate for
the whole sample, the estimate for the Internet sample is extremely imprecise.
D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001) argue that in recent years the marginal investor may
have become less sophisticated providing more incentives to distort earnings. In particular,
they show that the mean discretionary accruals for the top decile has been increasing over the
past twenty years, more than doubling since 1974. Mean discretionary earnings for the top
12Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that the Jones method is potentially ﬂawed as it calculates accruals indirectly
using balance sheet information rather than directly using income statement information. In particular, they point
out that the presumed equivalence between the former and the latter breaks down when nonoperating events such
as reclassiﬁcations, acquisitions, divestitures, accounting changes, and foreign currency translations occur. Hribar
and Collins show that these “non-articulating” events generate non-trivial measurement error in calculations of
discretionary accruals. Unfortunately, the necessary income-statement accruals information is only available after
1987. Fortunately, our results still hold even when we restrict the analysis to a sub-sample of ﬁrms that do not
have such non-articulation events or when we use income statement accruals in a post-1987 sample.
17decile was close to 30% in 1999. As a consequence, we re-estimate our baseline speciﬁcation
for the ﬁrm-years in the subperiod 1995-2000 in column (4) of Table 2-B. Consistent with
the D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001) hypothesis, the estimated coeﬃcient on discretionary
accruals is roughly a third bigger, moving from 0.1127 to 0.1507. Though we are left with
only a quarter of the number of observations, the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the one
percent level of signiﬁcance. In column (5), we restrict the sample further, to only those ﬁrm-
years in the subperiod 1998-2000. Consistent with the hypothesis that manipulating earnings
has become more eﬀective, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on discretionary accruals is almost 25%
higher than in the baseline regression.
Finally, in the last four columns of Table 2-B we split the sample in accordance with the
cross-sectional implications of our model. In particular, our model suggests that the greater
the expected duration of mispricing, the greater the incentive to overinvest (underinvest) when
overpriced (underpriced). We use ﬁrm R&D intensity to proxy for ﬁrm transparency based on
the simple assumption that the resolution of all valuation uncertainty (which would necessarily
eliminate any mispricing) takes longer for R&D projects than for the typical project. Column
(6) re-estimates our baseline regression for those ﬁrms below the median value of R&D intensity.
Note that we calculate medians yearly in order to isolate pure cross-sectional diﬀerences across
ﬁrms. Column (7) shows the results for the sub-sample of ﬁrms with R&D intensity above
the median. Consistent with our model, we ﬁnd economically important variation across the
two sub-samples. Firms that engage in a lot of R&D invest more when they have a lot of
discretionary accruals. The sensitivity of these ﬁrms’ investment to discretionary accruals,
.2428, is almost four times as large as the sensitivity of ﬁrms that we argue are relatively more
transparent.
Our model also suggests that the incentive to overinvest or underinvest is stronger for
those ﬁrms with short-term investors. We use ﬁrm share turnover to proxy for the relative
amount of short-term investors trading a ﬁrm’s stock. We measure turnover as the average,
in Decembert−1, of the daily ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding at the end of the
day. Column (8) re-estimates our baseline regression for those ﬁrms each year with turnover
below the yearly median, while column (9) reports the regression results for above-the-median
18ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on discretionary accruals for high-turnover ﬁrms is .0413,
30% higher than the corresponding coeﬃcient for ﬁrms with low turnover.
D Equity issuance and investment
A substantial literature documents two important facts. First, that ﬁrms tend to time equity
issues, repurchases, and dividends initiations. Second, that equity market timing is successful
on average as equity issuers (repurchasers) have low (high) subsequent returns.13 This empirical
evidence suggests that equity issuance activity is a good predictor of subsequent returns.
Indeed, Daniel and Titman (2001) construct a measure of net equity issuance that combines
ﬁrm’s equity issuance, repurchase activity, dividends initiation (omission). They show that ﬁrms
with high net equity issuance in the past ﬁve years have subsequent low stock returns in the
next year suggesting that they are overpriced.
Based on this evidence, we use net equity issuance in the past ﬁve years as our second
mispricing proxy. This variable is positively correlated with discretionary accruals (0.1180) and
the correlation is economically signiﬁcant. The correlation conﬁrms the results of the previous
literature that ﬁrms that issue equity are more likely to have higher discretionary accruals (Teoh,
et al.). However, the correlation is low enough that it is plausible to think of these two variables
as two alternative ways of measuring mispricing. We analyze them separately here, and combine
them later on.
Following Daniel and Titman (2001), we construct a measure of a ﬁrm’s equity issuance
/ repurchase activity, EQISSUEi,t, over a ﬁve-year period.14 They construct their measure
to also capture the evidence in Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) showing that abnormal
returns are high (low) for ﬁve years subsequent to dividend initiations (omissions). We deﬁne
EQISSUEi,t as the log of the inverse of the percentage ownership in the ﬁrm one would have
at time t, given a one percent ownership of the ﬁrm at time t−5, assuming full reinvestment of
13See, for example, Asquith and Mullins (1986), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1997), and Baker and Wurgler (2000, 2002).
14We also measured the same variable over a one-year period and produced similar results. Note that set our
EQISSUEi,t variable equal in absolute magnitude to Daniel and Titman (2002)’s n
0 variable but opposite in






where Ni,t is the number of shares outstanding at time t, MEi,t is the market value of equity
at time t, and ri,t−5:t is the log stock return from t − 5 to t. Therefore our measure includes
equity issues, employee stock options plans, share repurchase, dividends, and other actions that
pay cash out of the ﬁrm, or trade ownership for cash or services (e.g., stock options plans).
Our speciﬁcation is the following:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1




Column (1) of Table 3, Panel A displays the results of regression (5). Controlling for invest-
ment opportunities and ﬁnancial slack, ﬁrms that are net equity issuers over the past ﬁve years
invest more. The coeﬃcient of investment on the equity issuance activity measure, b1, measures
0.0259 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. The economic
importance of the eﬀect seems on the order of magnitude as before. A typical (one-standard
deviation) change in a ﬁrm’s equity issuance indicator is associated with roughly a two percent
change in that ﬁrm’s investment as a percentage of capital.
Unlike the discretionary accruals measure, where it is hard to think of alternative stories
generating a link with investment, one expects issuance activity to be tied to investment. Of
course, our regressions acknowledge the direct link by controlling for investment opportunities
and ﬁnancial slack. However, these controls are now crucial. Speciﬁcally, it very important
to rule out that EQISSUEi,t is correlated with Q’s measurement error. Thus, the remaining
columns in Table 3-A repeat the robustness checks we did with our previous variable.
In columns (2) through (4) of Table 3-A, we add analysts’ expectations of future proﬁtability.
Recall that these variables are designed to pick up variation in future investment opportunities
not picked up by Tobin’s Q. Consistent with our expectations that EQISSUEi,t may proxy
for unobserved investment opportunity, the coeﬃcient on EQISSUEi,t becomes smaller when
we include analysts’ consensus earning forecasts. However, we still ﬁnd that controlling for
investment opportunities, ﬁrms that are expected to underperform (overperform) benchmarks
20have investment that is too high (low).
In column (5) we instrument Q with the mean long-term consensus earning forecast. The
magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the EQISSUEi,t coeﬃcient is similar to our previous
results when we use instrumental variables estimation. Finally, our results are robust to using
the Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) measurement-error consistent estimator.
In columns (6) through (8) we control for future and past values of Q. Qt and Qt−2 are
statistically signiﬁcant, though with the wrong sign. However, the coeﬃcient on our equity
issuance indicator is essentially unchanged. The eﬀect remains economically and statistically
signiﬁcant. Table 3, Panel B reports the results from sub-sample analysis. Column (1) of Table
3-B restricts the sample to those ﬁrm-years in the subperiod 1995-2000 while column (2) restricts
the sample to those ﬁrm-years in 1998-2000. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect is still strong in the longer
subperiod. In the shorter subperiod, the eﬀect disappears. As before, we split the sample in
accordance with the cross-sectional implications of our model.
Column (3) re-estimates our baseline regression for those ﬁrms below the median value of
R&D intensity while column (4) re-estimates the regression for ﬁrms above the median value of
R&D intensity. Firms with less R&D activity have a weaker relation between equity issuance
and equity issuance activity. Firms involved in more R&D activity have a stronger relation
between investment and equity issuance activity. In columns (5) and (6), we split the sample
based on share turnover. Consistent with our model, ﬁrms with a relatively high amount of
share turnover have a coeﬃcient on equity issuance activity, .0493, that is twice as large as ﬁrms
with a relatively low amount of share turnover.
E Price momentum and investment
One problem with the previous two proxies of mispricing is that managers aﬀect discretionary
accruals, equity issuance, and investment. Our results indicates that there is correlation be-
tween investment and both discretionary accruals and equity issuance, but they can hardly say
anything about the direction of the causality. While high discretionary accruals may cause sub-
optimal investment decision, managers may decide to manipulate accruals to be able to invest
more. In fact, the model presented in Section II shows that initial mispricing causes suboptimal
21investment that in turn causes more mispricing.
Our next measure of mispricing suﬀers less from the reverse causality problem because it is
not directly chosen by the manager, and more generally reﬂects investors’ sentiments. Our next
measure exploits the ﬁrm and industry momentum phenomenon documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Yearly excess returns at either the ﬁrm
or industry level exhibit positive serial correlation. Also, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)
document long-term reversal of momentum proﬁts. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)
ﬁnd that cumulative proﬁts reach 12.17 percent after one year and then steadily decline to -0.44
percent after ﬁve years. Similar patterns exist in industry returns.
Several conﬂicting theories have been oﬀered to explain momentum and reversal. According
to Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998), investor overconﬁdence results in overreaction
to private information, implying long-run negative autocorrelation. Barberis Shleifer and Vishny
(1998) assume that investors are subject to a conservatism bias and representativeness heuristic.
Thus in their model investors underreact to earnings, causing short-lag positive autocorrelations.
However, when investors observe trends of rising earnings, representativeness causes them to
switch to overreaction, resulting in long-lag negative autocorrelation. In Hong and Stein (1999),
there are two types of investors: investors who focus only on fundamentals and ignore the
market price and investors who focus only on market price and follow price trends. The ﬁrst
group causes underreaction, the second group induces overreaction.
These three diﬀerent theories agree that momentum is a mispricing phenomenon, but dis-
agree on whether serial correlation of excess returns is consistent with stock prices slowly moving
towards their fundamental price (underreaction) or stock prices moving away from their funda-
mental price (overreaction). The evidence is mixed as to which explanation best describes the
data. For this reason, this measure is the weakest of our three. The interpretation of our result
depends on which description is appropriate. Nonetheless, we think it is interesting to investi-
gate the relation between momentum and investment decisions. That is because this measure
is tied more directly than the previous two measures to investor sentiment uncorrelated with
managerial decisions. In fact, the correlation between this measure and the previous two is
positive, but not very high (14 percent with DACCR and 21 percent with EQUISSUE).
22We use lagged ﬁrm and industry momentum as our ﬁnal indicator of ﬁrm mispricing. Firm
lagged momentum (MOMi,t−1) is the cross-sectionally demeaned (using the universe of all CRSP
stocks) stock return over the period Januaryt−1 to Novembert−1. Industry lagged momentum
(IMOMt−1) is the cross-sectionally demeaned (using the universe of all CRSP stocks) industry
return over the period Januaryt−1 to Novembert−1.
We lag momentum for two reasons. The ﬁrst is so that our Q variable will incorporate
any news concerning future returns and/or cash ﬂows contained in the price run-up. More
importantly, we interpret momentum as a characteristic predicting future mispricing. Firms
that are winners and losers are the ﬁrms that investors typically overreact to. Momentum
ﬁrms have negative stock returns in the years following the initial year of positive stock return
performance. This is in contrast to our other mispricing measures. We identify ﬁrms with








Column (1) of Table 4, Panel A displays the results of regression (6). Controlling for invest-
ment opportunities and ﬁnancial slack, ﬁrms experiencing price momentum invest more. The
coeﬃcient of investment on ﬁrm momentum, b1, measures 0.0282 with an associated t-statistic
of 7.3. A similar response occurs for the industry momentum variable. The coeﬃcient of invest-
ment on industry momentum, b2, is 0.0468. Thus, ﬁrms in price momentum industries invest
more than the standard model would indicate. This coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant; the
associated t-statistic is 3.9.
A typical (one-standard deviation) change in a ﬁrm’s price momentum is associated with
roughly a three percent change in that ﬁrm’s investment as a percentage of capital.15 One
percent movements in investment ratios are associated with typical moves in a ﬁrm’s industry
15These results relate to those of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). That paper predicts three-year investment
growth using lagged CAPM alphas over a three-year period. These alphas do a good job predicting investment
alone. However, in a horse race with future fundamentals, CAPM alphas have little additional explanatory
power. High alphas are related to high stock returns, our variable. However, we compare momentum to the level
of stock market valuation, Q. Thus the variable we pit against momentum contains expectations of all future
ﬁrm proﬁtability. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s control variables are purely accounting ones and therefore are
realizations of these expectations, and then only one year out.
23momentum.
These results are consistent with at least two alternative explanations. First, if momen-
tum ﬁrms are overpriced ﬁrms as in Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) our result
is consistent with the story that overpriced ﬁrms invest more than otherwise identical ﬁrms.
Alternatively, if momentum is evidence of underreaction (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), our
result may suggest that ﬁrms (at least those that are not cash constrained) invest optimally,
ignoring the market’s underreaction. Unfortunately, it is hard to distinguish between these two
cases.
Furthermore, there is more concern than with our previous variables that momentum is
correlated with our benchmark variables. First, price momentum may just reﬂect information
concerning the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and/or degree of ﬁnancial constraints not contained in Q or
CF
K . One could argue that sensitivity of investment to stock returns may indicate ﬁnancial
constraints being binding. More simply, ﬁrms with high stock returns may have very proﬁtable
growth options that their average Q only partially reﬂects. These ﬁrms should invest more. For
example, it is possible that the market has information about the ﬁrm that the manager does
not have. Dow and Gorton (1997) model the investment decisions of rational managers under
this hypothesis. In equilibrium, stock prices convey information to managers that they use to
allocate investment capital optimally. In their model rising stock prices cause higher investment
and the resulting investment allocation is eﬃcient. So far, we are not able to separate our model
from this particular alternative interpretation. We address this possibility later in the paper.
Our response to these alternative interpretations is to point out that we ﬁnd an eﬀect not
only at the ﬁrm level but also at the industry level. It is harder to argue that entire industries
are ﬁnancially constrained or have systematic diﬀerences between average and marginal Q.
The rest of Table 4-A estimates regressions with the same alternative speciﬁcations and
control variables as before. In columns (2), (3), and (4) we add the consensus analyst’s estimates
of future earnings. Both momentum variables remain economically and statistically signiﬁcant.16
In column (5) when we instrument Q with analyst’s long-term estimates of future earnings we
16The fact that in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, which includes forecasts one, two, and ﬁve years out, the coeﬃcient
on ﬁrm momentum is over ﬁfty percent higher than the baseline is mostly due to sample selection requirements
due to using the ﬁve-year forecast.
24instead ﬁnd that the momentum coeﬃcient increases by roughly 40 percent and the industry
momentum coeﬃcient increases by 100 percent.17 Also, columns (6),(7), and (8) show that the
timing of when we measure Q does not matter for our results. Finally, our results are robust to
using the Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) measurement-error consistent estimator as well.
In Table 4, Panel B we explore some of the cross-sectional ﬁndings in the literature concerning
momentum. Various studies have shown that momentum is stronger for losers than for winners.
Column (1) repeats the regression for ﬁrms experiencing negative momentum while column (3)
estimates the relation among winner ﬁrms. Recall that the coeﬃcient on ﬁrm momentum was
0.0282 in our baseline speciﬁcation. The estimate for ﬁrms with negative momentum is twice
as large, 0.0564, while the estimate for winning ﬁrms is 0.0188. Both estimates are signiﬁcant
at the one percent level of signiﬁcance.
In an attempt to distinguish between the overreaction and the underreaction hypothesis we
rely on the ﬁnding of Lee and Swaminathan (2000). They ﬁnd that overreaction patterns are
more pronounced for losers with low turnover and for winners with high turnover. In columns (2)
and (4) we interact ﬁrm momentum and turnover for loser ﬁrms and winner ﬁrms respectively.
In column (2), the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
the ten percent level of signiﬁcance. This result is consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2000).
In column (4) the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is 0.0034 with an associated t-statistic
of 1.55. Though not statistically signiﬁcant, the result is in line with Lee and Swaminathan’s
result that winners overreact more when turnover is high.
Column (5) of Table 4-B reports our baseline momentum speciﬁcation with our sample
restricted to only Internet ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of interest is an order of magnitude higher for
these ﬁrms. This estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This result is very
strong despite the limited number of observations and is in contrast to the weak corresponding
evidence concerning the sensitivity of Internet ﬁrms’ investment to discretionary accruals. We
think that this result is quite reassuring, since at least for this sample of ﬁrms it is hard to claim
that momentum is evidence of underreaction. And it is diﬃcult to interpret this subsample
evidence as consistent with the Dow and Gorton (1997) model. Recall that their model argues
17In this sample we ﬁnd, consistent with Abel and Eberly (2001), that the coeﬃcient of Q becomes one order
magnitude bigger, but the cash-ﬂow coeﬃcient does not change signiﬁcantly.
25that market returns are a signal from informed investors to managers to allocate investment
eﬃciently. Most researchers would agree that much of the return volatility of Internet stocks
was due to uninformative noise trading.
Column (6) of Table 4-B restricts the sample to those ﬁrm-years in the subperiod 1995-2000
while column (7) restricts the sample to those ﬁrm-years in 1998-2000. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect
is stronger in these two subperiods. As before, we split the sample in accordance with cross-
sectional implications of our model. Column (8) re-estimates our baseline regression for those
ﬁrms below the median value of R&D intensity while column (9) re-estimates the regression for
ﬁrms above the median value of R&D intensity. The results are consistent with our model’s
conclusions. The momentum eﬀect on investment is stronger for ﬁrms that engage in a lot of
R&D. The coeﬃcients on ﬁrm and industry momentum are more than twice as large for those
ﬁrms that we argue are relatively opaque. Columns (10) and (11) report the sample split based
on ﬁrm turnover. This split is not as successful as there is little or no diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients
on momentum for the two types of ﬁrms.
F Combining all three measures into a mispricing metric
Our ﬁnal measure uses the three variables in a ﬁrm-level vector autoregression (VAR) in order
to create a mispricing metric. This metric has the advantage that the information in the three
variables used in previous sections is used simultaneously. More importantly, the ability of each
of our measures to predict stock returns is measured at the price level. This is important as
even if all variables predict one-period returns with the same magnitude, those variables which
are more persistent have a larger price-level impact. Finally, the VAR lets us control for risks
so that mispricing is explicitly dependent on a model of market equilibrium.
A detailed description of the speciﬁcation and the results of the VAR is contained in the








Column (1) of Table 5 displays the results of regression (7). Controlling for investment opportu-
26nities and ﬁnancial slack, ﬁrms that are overpriced invest more. The coeﬃcient of investment on
our mispricing metric, b1, measures 0.2124 with an associated t-statistic of 7.37. Firms whose
current price is high relative to the CAPM invest more than the standard model would indicate.
This eﬀect is economically important. A typical (one-standard deviation) change in a typical
ﬁrm’s level of discretionary accruals is associated with roughly a four percent change in that
ﬁrm’s investment as a percentage of capital.
This ﬁnding is robust to using alternative speciﬁcations. In columns (2) through (4) of
Table 5, we add analysts’ expectations of future proﬁtability. We hope these variables pick up
variation in future investment opportunities not picked up by Tobin’s Q. Though the coeﬃcient
on MISPRICINGi,t is smaller, we still ﬁnd that controlling for investment opportunities, ﬁrms
that are “overpriced” (“underpriced”) invest more (less). In column (5) we follow our previous
speciﬁcation and we instrument Tobin’s Q with analysts’ expectations of long-term proﬁtability.
Our coeﬃcient is still positive, but become insigniﬁcant. However, our mispricing variable is
measured with error and it is correlated with our instrument (the correlation is 25%). Therefore,
the conditions that analysts’ expectations of long-term proﬁtability is a good instrument are
violated. In principle, we would need to ﬁnd another instrument for mispricing to solve the
problem. In columns (6) through (8) of Table 5, we include end-of-period Q as well lags of
Q. Neither the point estimate nor the precision of that estimate is aﬀected by these additional
controls.
We also estimated a version of Panel B of Tables 2, 3, and 4 using our composite mispricing
proxy. That table is available upon request. We ﬁnd that we are unable to reject the hypothesis
that the sensitivity of investment to mispricing varies with R&D intensity. The coeﬃcient on
mispricing for ﬁrms with R&D intensity below the median is 0.2294 while for ﬁrms with higher
R&D intensity, the coeﬃcient is 0.1725. However the split based on share turnover lines up with
the prediction of our model. The coeﬃcient on mispricing for relatively high share turnover ﬁrms
is 0.2183 while the coeﬃcient on mispricing for relatively low share turnover ﬁrms is 0.1251.
The results in Table 5 are robust to varying the characteristics used to predict future re-
turns and risks in the VAR. For example, using a long (1928-2000) panel, Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho (2002) argue that mispricing relative to the CAPM is not an important factor in
27determining the prices of high and low BE/ME stocks if CAPM risk is measured using long-
horizon covariances of cash-ﬂow fundamentals. Our short panel precludes such an approach.
Moreover, one might also be worried that BE/ME is too correlated with Tobin’s Q causing
collinearity in regressions of investment on Q and mispricing measures derived from BE/ME.
Therefore we repeat the analysis in Table 5 but manually set the ability of BE/ME to predict
returns equal to zero. Those results are qualitatively similar; mispricing explains investment
after controlling for investment opportunities and ﬁnancial slack.18
In summary we ﬁnd that our mispricing metric explains investment in a manner consistent
with our model. This ﬁnding is comforting as many alternative explanations as to why our three
proxies come in individually do not obviously extend to this composite measure.
G Eﬃcient or ineﬃcient investment?
So far, we have found a consistently strong positive correlation between our measures of mis-
pricing and investment. According to the model, the positive correlation is due to the fact
that over-priced ﬁrms take investment projects that have negative net present values. Similarly,
underpriced ﬁrms forego investment projects with positive net present value. While the empir-
ical results are consistent with ineﬃcient allocation of resources in equilibrium, there are other
potential explanations.
First, it is possible that equity-dependent ﬁrms with good investment opportunities manage
earnings (i.e. generate high discretionary accruals) to manipulate their stock price, facilitating
investment. The investment allocation in this case is eﬃcient and temporary mispricing helps
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms make investments that they otherwise would not be able to make.
This interpretation, though plausible, is not consistent with the previous ﬁndings that show
that ﬁrms with abnormally soft earnings actually have relatively poor operating performance in
subsequent years.
Another potential explanation for our results is outlined in Dow and Gorton (1997). In that
model, when the market has information that managers do not have, it is eﬃcient for managers
to make investment decisions taking into account stock prices. While this story does not explain
18Mispricing continues to explain investment if we manually set the ability of both momentum and BE/ME to
predict returns equal to zero.
28the relation between discretionary accruals and investment as discretionary accruals are set by
the manager, the Dow and Gorton explanation may partially explain why ﬁrms with high equity
issues and/or high stock returns invest more.
Finally, our mispricing proxies may instead represent rational heterogeneity in discount
rates. In this alternative explanation, ﬁrms with high discretionary accruals and high equity
issuance have low discount rates. It is hard to reconcile this explanation with our results
relating investment and price momentum at the ﬁrm or industry level as those characteristics
are associated with relatively higher realized returns.
One way we can provide additional evidence distinguishing our model from these alternative
explanations is to measure the relation between investment and future stock returns. In our
model there is a negative relation between investment and subsequent risk-adjusted returns as
ﬁrm business investment is linked to the market’s misvaluation of the ﬁrm’s equity.
We estimate cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns including investment, To-
bin’s Q and a control for cashﬂow sensitivity:19
Ri,t = at + b1,t ln
Ii,t−1
Ki,t−2




where returns are measured in percent. The regression identiﬁes cross-sectional variation in
returns that is correlated with investment, controlling for investment opportunities and ﬁnancial
slack, thus tying together return predictability and investment behavior.20
As in Fama and MacBeth (1976), we average the time-series of bt’s and report both the
mean and the standard error of the mean estimate. Column (1) of Table 6 shows the result of
estimating equation (8). The coeﬃcient on investment is -0.1579 with an associated t-statistic
of 3.96. Consistent with our model, ﬁrms that overinvest (underinvest) on average have returns
that are low (high).
Note that identiﬁcation is easier in this framework. In our previous investment regressions,
19We are not the ﬁrst looking at the relation between investment and returns. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2001)
show that ﬁrms that spend more on capital investment relatively to their sales or total assets subsequently have
negative benchmark-adjusted returns. See also Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003).
20Unlike the previous sample which used only December year-end ﬁrms, we use all available data as long as
there is a ﬁve-month lag between the month in which we are predicting returns and the ﬁscal year-end so that the
regression represents a valid trading rule. As in the previous sample, we eliminate ﬁrms with negative investment
and/or otherwise extreme accounting ratios.
29controls for marginal proﬁtability were crucial in order to isolate variation in investment linked
to mispricing. In these return regressions, we need only control for risk. Column (2) of Table 6
includes three ﬁrm characteristics that are associated with cross-sectional diﬀerences in average
returns: ﬁrm size (market capitalization), ﬁrm book-to-market equity, and ﬁrm momentum.
These characteristics are arguably proxies for risk. As in previous literature, each characteristic
predicts returns with a positive coeﬃcient. More importantly, these controls do not subsume
the investment eﬀect as the relevant coeﬃcient only drops two basis points and remains quite
statistically signiﬁcant.
One nice feature of the Fama-MacBeth approach is that the resulting time series of coeﬃ-
cients is simply a time series of realized returns on a portfolio. In results not shown, we have
benchmarked the coeﬃcient time series related to abnormal investment to the CAPM as well as
to other asset-pricing models. In all cases, abnormal returns remain negative and statistically
signﬁcant.
Our model predicts that this eﬀect will be stronger for ﬁrms facing a greater degree of
information asymmetry and/or short-term investors. In columns (3) through (6) we test these
predictions by splitting the sample based on R&D intensity and share turnover. Column (3)
of Table 6 re-estimates the relation between investment and subsequent stock returns for those
ﬁrms with below-median R&D each year while column (4) re-estimates the relation using only
those ﬁrms whose R&D is above the median each year. The eﬀect is nearly two and a half times
stronger for high R&D ﬁrms. The ability of investment to predict cross-sectional diﬀerences in
returns is not statistically signiﬁcant for low R&D ﬁrms. A full-sample regression (not shown)
which interacts investment with a dummy for above-median R&D documents that the diﬀerence
between the two coeﬃcients on investment in columns (3) and (4) is statistically signiﬁcant at
the one percent level.
Column (5) of Table 6 re-estimates the full regression for those ﬁrms with below-median
share turnover while column (6) re-estimates the relation using above-median share turnover
ﬁrms. Our model predicts that the eﬀect will be stronger for those ﬁrms with above-median
turnover. The results in those two columns are consistent with our model. The coeﬃcient on
investment is eighty percent higher for ﬁrms with high turnover. Firms with low share turnover
30have a coeﬃcient on investment that is not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. A full-sample
regression indicates that the diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant.
Of course, it is always possible that we are not appropriately controlling for risk. Perhaps
all of the predictive power of investment is due to cross-sectional variation in discount rates.21
However, it is hard to explain why variation in those discount rates is primarily found in ﬁrms
with above-median R&D and above-median turnover.
The next two columns split the sample according to ﬁrms’ Kaplan and Zingales index (1997).
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify ﬁrms into discrete categories of ﬁnancial constraint, and then
use an ordered logit regression to relate their classiﬁcations to accounting variables (using the 49
ﬁrms in the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) sample of low dividend manufacturing ﬁrms
with positive real sales growth). As in Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001), we construct a
KZ index using their regression coeﬃcients and ﬁve accounting ratios. The KZ index is higher
for ﬁrms that are more constrained. The ﬁve variables, along with the signs of their coeﬃcients
in the KZ index, are: cash ﬂow to total capital (negative), the market to book ratio (positive),
debt to total capital (positive), dividends to total capital (negative), and cash holdings to capital
(negative). We provide additional information in the appendix.
We split the sample according to ﬁrms’ degree of ﬁnancial constraints in order to distinguish
our model, where unconstrained ﬁrms may invest in negative NPV projects when overpriced,
from other models, where ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are able to invest more eﬃciently when
overpriced. Column (7) estimates the relation between investment and subsequent stock re-
turns for below-median KZ ﬁrms; column (8) estimates the relation for above-median KZ ﬁrms.
Though the coeﬃcient of returns on investment is higher for ﬁrms with above-median KZ index,
the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. The investment of unconstrained ﬁrms still predicts
negative future returns. This eﬀect is economically and statistically strong.
The ﬁnal regression in column (9) adds our previous mispricing proxies, discretionary ac-
cruals and equity issuance, to the right-hand side. If the ability of these two proxies to explain
investment actually works through a mispricing channel rather than a proﬁtability channel then
21Other papers ﬁnd similar results at the aggregate or industry level. Cochrane (1991) ﬁnds that investment
has signiﬁcant forecasting power for aggregate stock returns. Lamont (2000) documents that planned investment
has substantial forecasting power at both the aggregate and industry level. Both authors argue that their ﬁndings
are consistent with variation in discount rates.
31we should see the coeﬃcient on investment move closer to zero. This is exactly what happens.
Recall that the coeﬃcient on investment for the full sample was -0.1372. After the inclusion
of our two mispricing proxies, that coeﬃcient drops by almost ﬁfty percent to -0.0702. In fact
the coeﬃcient is now no longer signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. This result brings the anal-
ysis full circle, linking the previous investment-Q regressions with these return predictability
regressions in a manner consistent with our model.22
IV Conclusions
We present a simple framework that shows that a ﬁrm’s investment decision is aﬀected by the
market (mis)valuation of the company even if new investment projects are not ﬁnanced by
new equity. In the model managers with private information about the quality of the ﬁrm’s
investment may invest ineﬃciently on behalf of shareholders. The reason is that the investment
decision serves as a signal of ﬁrm value and can be used to manipulate stock prices to share-
holders’ advantage. If ﬁrms are mispriced, ineﬃcient investment can be predicted with ex-ante
variables.
In the empirical part of the paper we show that variables which predict relatively low stock
returns are positively correlated with investment, controlling for investment opportunities and
ﬁnancial slack. In particular we show that a typical change in one of our “mispricing proxies”
results in roughly a two to four percent change in the ﬁrm’s investment as a percentage of
capital. This relation is robust to formally measuring mispricing using the output from a ﬁrm-
level VAR. Our model predicts that these sensitivities should be greater, the greater the degree
of asymmetric information between ﬁrms and investors. We ﬁnd that is generally the case as
the eﬀect is weaker for ﬁrms with relatively low R&D intensity. Our model also predicts that
22A potential problem with this result is that if Q is measured with error, the regression coeﬃcients may be
biased. We tried to apply the Erickson and Whited (2002) high-order moment estimators to our larger, longer
sample. However, use of these estimators requires ﬁrst passing a test of the model’s two identifying assumptions:
i) Q predicts future returns, controlling for other variables and ii) the residuals in a linear regression of Q on
these control variables are skewed. Even for the simplest speciﬁcation in column (1), we are unable to reject
the null hypothesis implied by the model’s identifying assumptions for half of the cross sections. For the other
speciﬁcations which include book-to-market equity as a control variable, more than 75% of the cross-sections
fail the Erickson-Whited identiﬁcation test. In both cases, OLS estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant for the
cross sections that pass the Erickson-Whited identiﬁcation test. This suggests that any failure to reject the null
hypothesis using their estimator on those cross section may simply be due to a lack of power.
32the eﬀects should be stronger for ﬁrms with short-term investors. We ﬁnd that this is generally
the case as the eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms with relatively high share turnover.
The thrust of these results are generally consistent with Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)
and Chirinko and Schaller (2001) as sentiment aﬀects real investment. However our results diﬀer
in the fact that in our paper, the inﬂuence of sentiment on real investment works through a
catering rather than an equity-issuance channel.
We also show that patterns in the cross-section of average returns are consistent with those
patterns in investment. Firms with high (low) investment have low (high) subsequent stock
returns, controlling for investment opportunities and other characteristics linked to return pre-
dictability. As in our model, this relation is stronger for ﬁrms with above-median R&D intensity
or above-median turnover. We argue that these ﬁndings represent evidence that mispricing in
the capital markets may have signiﬁcant consequences for the real economy. Our paper focuses
on one important capital allocation decision. Similarly, one can study other corporate decisions
such as hiring employees or engaging in acquisition activity within this context. For example,
Shleifer and Vishny (2001) argue that the cost of equity is a strong determinant of merger
activity.
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39Table 1:
Summary Statistics
The data comes from both the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and the Zacks database. Investment,
Ii,t−1, is capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT item 128). Capital, Ki,t−1, is net property, plant, and equipment
(COMPUSTAT item 8). We deﬁne discretionary accruals, DACCRi,t, as the diﬀerence between realized accruals
and normal accruals as forecast by the modiﬁed Jones (1991) model, where normal accruals are computed by a
simple regression of total accruals on non-credit sales growth and capital across all ﬁrms with the same two-digit
SIC code. See the appendix for details. Our measure of equity issuance activity, EQISSUEi,t, captures equity
issues, share repurchases, dividends, and other actions that pay cash out of the ﬁrm, or trade ownership for
cash or services (e.g., stock options plans) over the period t − 5 to t. Lagged ﬁrm momentum, MOMi,t−1, is
the cross-sectionally demeaned (using the universe of all CRSP stocks) stock return over the period Januaryt−1
to Novembert−1. Lagged industry momentum, IMOMi,t−1, is the cross-sectionally demeaned (using the uni-
verse of all CRSP stocks) industry return over the period Januaryt−1 to Novembert−1 using the two-digit SIC
classiﬁcation. Tobin’s Q, Qi,t−1, is deﬁned as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets,
Ai,t−1 (COMPUSTAT item 6). A ﬁrm’s market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market
value of common stock less the sum of book value of common stock (COMPUSTAT item 60) and balance sheet
deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT item 74). Cash ﬂow, CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2, equals the sum of earnings before extraor-
dinary items (COMPUSTAT item 18) and depreciation (COMPUSTAT item 14) over beginning of year capital
which we deﬁne as net property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT item 8). One-year expected proﬁtability,
Et−1[EARNi,t]/Ai,t−1, is the median analyst year t − 1 forecast of earnings in year t divided by the book value
of assets in year t−1. Two-year expected proﬁtability, Et−1[EARNi,t+1]/Ai,t−1, is the median analyst year t−1
forecast of earnings in years t and t + 1 divided by the book value of assets in year t − 1. Five-year expected
proﬁtability, Et−1[EARNi,t+4]/Ai,t−1, is the median analyst year t − 1 forecast of earnings in years t through
t + 4 divided by the book value of assets in year t − 1. R&Di,t−1/Ai,t−1 measures R&D intensity (R&D expense
(COMPUSTAT item 46) over the book value of assets). Share turnover, TURNi,t−1 is the average, in December
t−1, of the daily ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding at the end of the day. BE/MEi,t is ﬁrm book-to-
market equity (described in the appendix). KZi,t is Kaplan-Zingales index of ﬁnancial constraints, deﬁned in the
appendix
40Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 .31543318 .40981705 .000055 9.8948135 53585
DACCRi,t 0.0037146 0.1735791 -1.901459 1.466965 48340
EQISSUEi,t .34047265 1.2368979 -8.5319862 16.595188 37761
MOMi,t−1 .02231656 .8655887 -3.3779354 19.338051 53585
IMOMi,t−1 .03217884 .89540824 -3.5319417 4.8756251 53585
Qi,t−1 1.5613214 1.5692514 .074246 82.470253 53585
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 .46286134 1.1810156 -9.9966278 9.9881659 53585
Si,t−1 1017.1091 3938.6659 10.002 160883 53585
Ai,t−1 1277799.8 5897335.8 1878 3.281e+08 53585
Et−1[EARNi,t]/Ai,t−1 .04385347 .13160954 -6.1592259 13.147612 25249
Et−1[EARNi,t+1]/Ai,t−1 .07059737 .08605749 -3.8495162 2.0628276 24278
Et−1[EARNi,t+4]/Ai,t−1 1.746586 3.7817765 -2.403513 120.72811 20628
R&Di,t−1/Ai,t−1 .04555467 .07023887 0 2.051975 24153
TURNi,t−1 1.4973921 2.3476327 0 252.16142 27834
BE/MEi,t−1 0.975 0.992 0.100 47.287 106,960
KZ -0.118 2.239 -4.999 46.843 90132
41Table 2:
Discretionary accruals and Firm Investment
The dependent variable is the proportion of investment over beginning of year capital. High discretionary
accruals, HIGHDACCRi,t−1, is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm has discretionary accruals in the top 20th
percentile, and zero otherwise. High equity issuance activity, HIGHEQISSUEi,t−1, is a dummy equal to one
if the ﬁrm has equity issuance in the top 25th percentile, and zero otherwise. For a description of all the other
variables see the legend of Table 1. Panel A shows the results for the entire sample. All columns are OLS
regressions with the exception of column (5) that reports an IV regression where we instrument Tobin’s Q, Qi,t−1
with ﬁve-year expected proﬁtability (as described in Table 1). In Panel B Columns (1) and (2) show results for
the whole sample. Column (3) shows the results only for internet stock ﬁrms. Internet stock ﬁrms are deﬁned
as the ﬁrms that have been included in the ISDEX (Internet Stock Index). Column (4) shows results for the
ﬁrm-years in the subperiod, 1995-2000. Column (5) shows results for the ﬁrm-years in the subperiod, 1998-2000.
Column (6) shows results for the ﬁrms that have below-median R&D intensity. Column (7) shows results for those
ﬁrms that have above-median R&D intensity. Column (8) shows results for those ﬁrms that have below-median
ﬁrm share turnover. Column (9) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median ﬁrm share turnover. We
calculate medians on a year by year basis. All regressions include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering of the residual at the year level. Coeﬃcients starred with one,
two, and three asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level respectively.
42Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DACCRi,t 0.1266*** 0.1586*** 0.1555*** 0.1678*** 0.1303*** 0.1200*** 0.0762*** 0.0705***
(0.0173) (0.0200) (0.0224) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0180) (0.0153) (0.0170)
Qi,t−1 0.0576*** 0.0532*** 0.0493*** 0.0449*** 0.1404*** 0.0661*** 0.0564*** 0.0571***
(0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0233) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0056)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0725*** 0.0659*** 0.0680*** 0.0706*** 0.0454*** 0.0754*** 0.0695*** 0.0703***
(0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0154) (0.0085) (0.0103) (0.0099)












Observations 48340 23229 22354 18678 18982 46099 39010 35669
R-squared 0.5054 0.5974 0.6063 0.6232 0.0296 0.4420 0.4393 0.4393
4
3Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DACCRi,t 0.1127*** 0.0874*** 0.1071 0.1507*** 0.1390*** 0.0655* 0.2428*** 0.0317 0.0413*
(0.0187) (0.0173) (0.7567) (0.0242) (0.0534) (0.0389) (0.0335) (0.0261) (0.0246)
Qi,t−1 0.0574*** 0.0576*** 0.0116 0.0490*** 0.0352*** 0.1122*** 0.0456*** 0.0324*** 0.0590***
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0173) (0.0119) (0.0095) (0.0125) (0.0084) (0.0049) (0.0071)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0725*** 0.0724*** 0.0879 0.0473*** 0.0238 0.0910*** 0.0575*** 0.0635*** 0.1299***
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.1098) (0.0074) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0122) (0.0147) (0.0219)
HIGHDACCRi,t 0.0100**
(0.0049)
DACCRi,t ∗ HIGHEQISSUEi,t 0.0605***
(0.0213)
Observations 48340 48340 113 12933 6534 11473 11455 12288 12216
R-squared 0.5054 0.5055 0.6439 0.6103 0.7446 0.5649 0.5755 0.3853 0.4531
4
4Table 3:
Equity issuance and Firm Investment
The dependent variable is the proportion of investment over beginning of year capital. High discretionary
accruals, HIGHDACCRi,t−1, is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm has discretionary accruals in the top 20th
percentile, and zero otherwise. High equity issuance activity, HIGHEQISSUEi,t−1, is a dummy equal to one
if the ﬁrm has equity issuance in the top 25th percentile, and zero otherwise. For a description of all the other
variables see the legend of Table 1. In Panel A we report the results for the entire sample. All columns are
OLS regressions with the exception of column (5) that reports an IV regression where we instrument Tobin’s
Q, Qi,t−1 with ﬁve-year expected proﬁtability (as described in Table 1). In Panel B, Column (1) we report
the results for the ﬁrm-years in the subperiod, 1995-2000. Column (2) shows results for the ﬁrm-years in the
subperiod, 1998-2000. Column (3) shows results for the ﬁrms that have below-median R&D intensity. Column
(4) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median R&D intensity. Column (5) shows results for those ﬁrms
that have below-median ﬁrm share turnover. Column (6) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median
ﬁrm share turnover. We calculate medians on a year by year basis. All regressions include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering of the residual at the year level.
Coeﬃcients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent
level respectively.
45Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EQISSUEi,t 0.0259*** 0.0166*** 0.0162*** 0.0164*** 0.0183*** 0.0287*** 0.0264*** 0.0266***
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Qi,t−1 0.0454*** 0.0491*** 0.0452*** 0.0453*** 0.0461*** 0.0540*** 0.0593*** 0.0603***
(0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0064) (0.0125) (0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0055)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0789*** 0.0493*** 0.0526*** 0.0639*** 0.0727*** 0.0789*** 0.0805*** 0.0795***
(0.0119) (0.0098) (0.0114) (0.0146) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120)












Observations 37761 17283 16631 14220 14451 36212 35366 34867
R-squared 0.409 0.571 0.578 0.548 0.100 0.415 0.419 0.424
4
6Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EQISSUEi,t 0.0187*** 0.0026 0.0210*** 0.0279*** 0.0224*** 0.0493***
(0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0092)
Qi,t−1 0.0566*** 0.0517*** 0.0534*** 0.0432*** 0.0177*** 0.0283***
(0.0063) (0.0032) (0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0056) (0.0047)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0403*** 0.0245 0.0974*** 0.0646*** 0.0874*** 0.1572***
(0.0138) (0.0245) (0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0228) (0.0257)
Observations 8346 4327 8631 8558 11784 11301
R-squared 0.563 0.668 0.454 0.543 0.328 0.406
47Table 4:
Momentum and Firm Investment
The dependent variable is the proportion of investment over beginning of year capital. For a description of
this and all the other variables see the legend of Table 1. Panel A reports results for the whole sample. All
columns are OLS regressions with the exception of column (5) that reports an IV regression where we instrument
Tobin’s Q, Qi,t−1 with ﬁve-year expected proﬁtability (as described in Table 1). In Panel B, Columns (1) and
(2) show results for the sample of ﬁrms that have negative momentum. Columns (3) and (4) show results for
the sub-sample of ﬁrms that have positive momentum. Column (5) shows the results only for internet stock
ﬁrms. Internet stock ﬁrms are deﬁned as the ﬁrms that have been included in the ISDEX (Internet Stock Index).
Column (6) shows results for the ﬁrm-years in the subperiod, 1995-2000. Column (7) shows results for the ﬁrm-
years in the subperiod, 1998-2000. Column (8) shows results for the ﬁrms that have below-median R&D intensity.
Column (9) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median R&D intensity. Column (10) shows results for
those ﬁrms that have below-median ﬁrm share turnover. Column (11) shows results for those ﬁrms that have
above-median ﬁrm share turnover. We calculate medians on a year by year basis. All regressions include ﬁrm
and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering of the residual at
the year level. Coeﬃcients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve,
and one percent level respectively.
48Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MOMi,t−1 0.0282*** 0.0356*** 0.0381*** 0.0461*** 0.0700*** 0.0262*** 0.0282*** 0.0276***
(0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0065) (0.0106) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0034)
IMOMi,t−1 0.0126*** 0.0057** 0.0042* 0.0073** 0.0113*** 0.0137*** 0.0147*** 0.0135***
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0404) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Qi,t−1 0.0532*** 0.0508*** 0.0460*** 0.0419*** 0.1345*** 0.0606*** 0.0467*** 0.0476***
(0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0241) (0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0054)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0732*** 0.0642*** 0.0662*** 0.0696*** 0.0561*** 0.0755*** 0.0675*** 0.0678***
(0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0144) (0.0087) (0.0097) (0.0093)












Observations 53585 25249 24278 20290 20628 51045 43008 39255
R-squared 0.495 0.603 0.611 0.630 0.070 0.495 0.442 0.444
4
9Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
MOMi,t−1 0.0564*** 0.0366*** 0.0188*** 0.0176** 0.2358* 0.0340*** 0.0348** 0.0157*** 0.0339*** 0.0215*** 0.0204***
(0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0048) (0.0086) (0.1228) (0.0065) (0.0147) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0037)
IMOMi,t−1 0.0111*** 0.0112*** 0.0165*** 0.0136*** 0.0060 0.0024 0.0046** 0.0170*** 0.0094*** 0.0115***
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0137) (0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0032)
Qi,t−1 0.0733*** 0.0336*** 0.0397*** 0.0342*** 0.0271 0.0489*** 0.0364*** 0.1153*** 0.0443*** 0.0250*** 0.0531***
(0.0089) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0173) (0.0111) (0.0064) (0.0143) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0078)
CFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0660*** 0.0880*** 0.0863*** 0.1144*** 0.0536 0.0434*** 0.0206 0.0918*** 0.0558*** 0.0672 0.1259***
(0.0093) (0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0241) (0.0830) (0.0075) (0.0169) (0.0199) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0195)
MOMi,t−1 ∗ TURNi,t−1 -0.0035* 0.0034
(0.0018) (0.0022)
Observations 30216 15232 23369 12602 121 14069 7136 12086 12067 13957 13877
R-squared 0.539 0.487 0.646 0.451 0.671 0.610 0.746 0.558 0.579 0.469 0.440
5
0Table 5:
Mispricing and Firm Investment
The dependent variable is the proportion of investment over beginning of year capital. MISPRICINGi,t is
the mispricing metric derived from the ﬁrm-level VAR model of Table 8 and described in the text. All the other
variables are described in the legend of Table 1. All columns are OLS regressions with the exception of column
(5) that reports an IV regression where we instrument Tobin’s Q, Qi,t−1 with ﬁve-year expected proﬁtability
(as described in Table 1). All regressions include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are corrected for clustering of the residual at the year level. Coeﬃcients starred with one, two, and
three asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level respectively.
51(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MISPRICINGi,t 0.2124*** 0.1535*** 0.1464*** 0.1542*** 0.0936 0.2102*** 0.2229*** 0.2221***
(0.0288) (0.0312) (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0620) (0.0286) (0.0294) (0.0296)
Qt−1 0.0390*** 0.0394*** 0.0398*** 0.0383*** 0.0703*** 0.0376*** 0.0437*** 0.0440***
(0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0075) (0.0216) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0059)
CFt−1/Kt−2 0.0909*** 0.0652*** 0.0611*** 0.0641*** 0.0667*** 0.0910*** 0.0914*** 0.0914***
(0.0146) (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0108) (0.0175) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146)












Observations 23347 12914 12520 10787 10923 23347 23347 23347
R-squared 0.460 0.587 0.608 0.576 0.108 0.460 0.461 0.461
5
2Table 6:
Investment and future stock returns
The table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional monthly stock return regressions. The
independent variables include investment over beginning of year capital, Tobin’s Q, cash ﬂow, book-to-market
equity, ﬁrm size, price momentum, discretionary accruals, and equity issuance. For a description of the variables
see the legend of Table 1. Columns (1), (2), and (9) show results for the whole sample. Column (3) shows results
for the ﬁrms that have below-median research and development intensity. Column (4) shows results for those ﬁrms
that have above-median research and development intensity. Column (5) shows results for the ﬁrms that have
below-median ﬁrm share turnover. Column (6) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median ﬁrm share
turnover. Column (7) shows results for the ﬁrms that have below-median values of the Kaplan-Zingales index of
ﬁnancial constraints, deﬁned in the appendix. Column (8) shows results for those ﬁrms that have above-median
values of the KZ index. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coeﬃcients starred with one, two, and three
asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level respectively.
53(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
intercept 1.1561*** 3.2108*** 2.7542*** 3.9667*** 1.9802*** 3.0249*** 2.7679*** 3.7459*** 3.7119***
(0.3109) (0.6949) (0.7680) (0.8771) (0.6625) (0.7845) (0.6639) (0.7248) (0.7449)
lnIi,t−1/Ki,t−2 -0.1579*** -0.1372*** -0.1058 -0.2489*** -0.0670 -0.1151*** -0.1182*** -0.1624*** -0.0702*
(0.0399) (0.0342) (0.0794) (0.0887) (0.0417) (0.0491) (0.0451) (0.0417) (0.0385)
lnQi,t−1 -0.4161*** 0.3061*** 0.2219 0.1909 0.3818** -0.0970 0.2946 -0.0307 0.1055
(0.1067) (0.1131) (0.2723) (0.2355) (0.1882) (0.1664) (0.2008) (0.1663) (0.1355)
lnCFi,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.0714* 0.0179 0.0310 -0.1420 -0.0266 0.0193 -0.0089 0.0413 -0.0089
(0.0389) (0.0318) (0.1315) (0.1737) (0.0640) (0.0512) (0.0733) (0.1030) (0.0404)
lnMEi,t−1 -0.1900*** -0.1447*** -0.2351*** -0.0901** -0.1755*** -0.1400*** -0.2488*** -0.2044***
(0.0474) (0.0514) (0.0588) (0.0451) (0.0518) (0.0440) (0.0518) (0.0525)
lnBE/MEi,t−1 0.3541*** 0.5003*** 0.2643 0.2888*** 0.1681 0.3443** 0.2199** 0.1625*
(0.0762) (0.1815) (0.1893) (0.1183) (0.1033) (0.1518) (0.0995) (0.0867)
lnMOMi,t−1 0.9665*** 0.8603*** 0.7332*** 0.7992*** 1.2381*** 0.9160*** 0.9153*** 0.7033***







A. Description of the Data
Investment (It) is capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT item 128). Capital (Kt−1) is net property, plant,
and equipment (COMPUSTAT item 8). Qt−1 equals the market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets (COMPUSTAT item 6). Market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of
common stock less the sum of book value of common stock (COMPUSTAT item 6) and balance sheet deferred
taxes (COMPUSTAT item 74) in year t-1. Cash ﬂow (CFt−1) equals the sum of earnings before extraordinary
items (COMPUSTAT item 18) and depreciation (COMPUSTAT item 14) over beginning of year capital. Sales
(COMPUSTAT item 12) is net sales. One-year expected proﬁtability (Et−1[ROAt]) is the median analyst year
t-1 forecast of earnings in year t divided by the book value of assets (COMPUSTAT item 6). Two-year expected
proﬁtability (Et−1[ROAt+1]) is the median analyst year t-1 forecast of earnings in year t+1 divided by the book
value of assets (COMPUSTAT item 6) in year t-1. Five-year expected proﬁtability (Et−1[ROAt+4]) is the median
analyst year t-1 forecast of earnings in year t+4 divided by the book value of assets (COMPUSTAT item 6) in
year t-1. R&D intensity is R&D expense (COMPUSTAT item 46) over the book value of assets (COMPUSTAT
item 6). We ignore ﬁrms with negative accounting numbers for book assets, capital, or investment. We drop
those ﬁrms with extreme values for the accounting ratios we study as those observations probably represent data
errors.
We construct this component of accruals using the cross-sectional adaptation developed in Teoh, Welch,
and Wong (1998a, 1998b) of the modiﬁed Jones (1991) model. Accruals (ACCRt) equal the change in accounts
receivable (COMPUSTAT data item 2) plus the change in inventories (COMPUSTAT data item 3) plus the change
in other current assets (COMPUSTAT data item 68) minus the change in accounts payable (COMPUSTAT
data item 70) minus the change in other current liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 72) minus depreciation
(COMPUSTAT data item 178). A model of normal accruals is ﬁrst computed by a regression of total accruals
on sales growth (the change in COMPUSTAT data item 2) and capital (COMPUSTAT data item 8) across all
ﬁrms with the same two-digit SIC code, but excluding the ﬁrm under consideration). We require at least 25

















We then apply these estimates to the ﬁrm under consideration.















Note that as in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), before applying the estimates, we ﬁrst subtract the increase
in accounts receivable (the change in COMPUSTAT data item 12) from sales to allow for the manipulation of





Following Daniel and Titman (2002), we construct a measure of a ﬁrm’s equity issuance / repurchase activity,
EQISSUEi,t, over a ﬁve-year period. We deﬁne EQSSUEi,t as the log of the inverse of the percentage ownership
in the ﬁrm one would have at time t, given a one percent ownership of the ﬁrm at time t − 5, assuming full





where Ni,t is the number of shares outstanding at time t, MEi,t is the market value of equity at time t, and
ri,t−5:t is the log stock return from t − 5 to t.
We compute book-to-market equity, BE/MEi,t. Book equity is deﬁned as stockholders’ equity, plus balance
sheet deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if available), plus
post-retirement beneﬁt liabilities (data item 330) (if available) minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending
on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or par value (data item 130) (in
that order) for the book value of preferred stock. We calculate stockholders’ equity used in the above formula
as follows. We prefer the stockholders’ equity number reported by COMPUSTAT (data item 216). If neither
one is available, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of common equity (data item 60) plus the par
value of preferred stock. (Note that the preferred stock is added at this stage because it is later subtracted in
the book equity formula.) If common equity is not available, we compute stockholders’ equity as the book value
of assets (data item 6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from COMPUSTAT.
The price-to-book ratio used to form portfolios in May of year t is book common equity for the ﬁscal year
ending in calendar year t-1, divided by market equity at the end of May of year t. We require the ﬁrm to have
a valid past price-to-book ratio. Moreover, in order to eliminate likely data errors, we discard those ﬁrms with
price-to-book ratio less than 0.01 and greater than 100. When using COMPUSTAT as our source of accounting
information, we require that the ﬁrm must be on COMPUSTAT for two years. This requirement alleviates most
of the potential survivor bias due to COMPUSTAT backﬁlling data.
The KZ index is: -1.001909*[(Item 18+Item 14)/Item 8]+.2826389*[(Item 6+CRSP December Market Equity-
Item 60-Item 74)/Item 6]+3.139193*[(Item 9+Item 34)/(Item 9+Item 34+Item 216)] -39.3678*[(Item 21+Item
19)/Item 8]-1.314759*[Item 1/Item 8]. Item numbers refer to COMPUSTAT annual data items. Data item 8 is
lagged.
B. Mispricing Metric
Let zi,t be a vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables describing a ﬁrm i at time t. The ﬁrst element of the
vector is the ﬁrm’s market-adjusted annual stock return, ri,t. The second element of the vector is the yearly
56measure of the ﬁrm’s systematic risk according to the CAPM, βi,t, while other ﬁrm characteristics that predict
future risks and returns make up the rest of the elements in zi,t. An individual ﬁrm’s state vector is assumed to
follow a linear law:
zi,t = Γzi,t−1 + ui,t
The linear nature of the VAR easily generates forecasts of the state, Et[zi,t+j] = Γ
jzi,t. Deﬁne e1
0 ≡ [1 0
... 0] and e2
0 ≡ [0 1 ... 0]. At a particular point in time, we take the VAR’s forecasts for J future cross-sections
of returns, e1
0Γ
jzi,t, and risks, e2
0Γ
jzi,t, and run a cross-sectional regression of forecasted returns on forecasted
risks, period by period.
e1
0Γ
jzi,t = a + be2
0Γ
jzi,t + ei,t+j
We then compound the residuals from the J cross-sectional regressions into a mispricing metric, MISPRICINGi,t =
J Q
j=1
(1 + ei,t+j). In theory, for each year of the sample we should predict returns and risk into the inﬁnite future;
in practice, any impact to MISPRICINGi,t is negligible after 15 years.
In estimating the VAR coeﬃcient matrix, we follow Vuolteenaho (2002) and use weighted least squares,
deﬂating the annual data for each ﬁrm by the number of ﬁrms in the corresponding cross-section. We calculate
standard error estimates correcting for clustering of the residual at the year level.
We consider the following parsimonious speciﬁcation of the VAR. The vector contains the stock return, ri,t;
the market return beta measured over the previous 12 months, β
short
i,t ; the market return beta, β
long
i,t , measured
using at least 36 and as many as 60 of the previous months; log book-to-market equity, BE/MEi,t; as well as
our previous measures DACCRi,t and EQISSUEi,t. All variables are market-adjusted, i.e. cross-sectionally
demeaned. The appendix describes how we calculate book-to-market equity. Note that we use forecasts of
future 12-month return betas as our measure of risk so that return forecasts exactly correspond to risk forecasts.
However we also include a more precise three to ﬁve year estimate of beta to help us forecast that risk. Finally,
we include four lags of the stock return in the vector, zi,t, in order to measure the long term eﬀect of our third
variable, lagged momentum, on stock returns.
23
Table A.1 reports the result of the VAR. The model variables include the market-adjusted stock return, ri,t
(the ﬁrst element of the state vector z); the market-adjusted 12-month beta, β
short
i,t (the second element), the
market-adjusted beta, β
long
i,t , estimated using from 36 to 60 months of data, the market-adjusted log of the ﬁrm
book-to-market equity, lnBE/MEi,t; market-adjusted discretionary accruals, DACCRi,t ; and market-adjusted
equity issuance activity, EQISSUEi,t. We ﬁnd that point estimates of the coeﬃcients on the lagged stock
return, log book-to-market equity, and discretionary accruals are economically large and have the same sign
as previous research. Due to the severe data restrictions required in order to measure discretionary accruals,
23We also estimated the VAR excluding four lags of stock returns and all the results reported in Table 9 are
essentially the same.
57only the coeﬃcient on discretionary accruals is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, with a t-statistic of
-2.41. The coeﬃcient on book-to-market is close to being marginally statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic of 1.64).
However the point estimates for book-to-market as well as the lagged stock return are similar to estimates from
longer periods where we do not include discretionary accruals. The ability of the equity issuance variable to
predict subsequent stock returns is subsumed by the other variables in the VAR.
The coeﬃcients on lagged returns may help answer the question as to whether momentum proﬁts reverse.
Though the coeﬃcients on returns three to ﬁve years in the past are large and jointly similar to the coeﬃcient
on the lagged stock return, in a test not reported we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are jointly
equal to zero. This result suggests that overall the reversal of momentum proﬁts is not signiﬁcant. One possible
explanation for this is as suggested by the corresponding theories, momentum may measure overreaction in some
cases and underreaction in others, therefore for the overall sample we do not ﬁnd that momentum proﬁts reverse
in a statistically signiﬁcant way.
The remaining columns in Table document the predictability of each element in the VAR. Our measure of
risk, β
short
i,t , is forecastable using both lagged own values as well as lagged values of β
long
i,t . Interestingly, ﬁrms
with relatively high levels of discretionary accruals have relatively lower betas over the subsequent year. As is
well-known, ﬁrms’ book-to-market ratios are persistent. Other strong results include market-adjusted returns
being positively related to subsequent market-adjusted discretionary accruals.
The one-period predictability of market-adjusted stock returns in combination with the estimates relating
current characteristics to future characteristics generates a mispricing measure for each ﬁrm at each point in
time. Figure 1.A plots the histogram of these estimates. The average mispricing is about 1.64%. The standard
deviation is approximately 18.65%. As one might guess, the distribution of the estimates is right-skewed.
Table I.A: Firm-level VAR of risk and return
For a detailed description of the variables see the legend of Table 1. The standard errors reported in paren-
theses are corrected for clustering of the residual at the year level. Coeﬃcients starred with one, two, and three
asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level respectively.





i,t B/MEi,t DACCRi,t EQISSUEi,tt
ri,t−1 0.0241 -0.2905*** 0.0019 0.0872*** -0.0031 -0.1542*
(0.0243) (0.0100) (0.0059) (0.0283) (0.0023) (0.0264)
β
12
i,t−1 0.0056 0.0328** 0.0418*** -0.0057 0.0004 0.0051
(0.0050) (0.0141) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0016) (0.0117)
β
36−60
i,t−1 -0.0119 0.4110*** 0.8006*** 0.0161 -0.0067** -0.0715*
(0.0220) (0.0447) (0.0398) (0.0198) (0.0025) (0.0411)
lnBE/MEi,t−1 0.0365 -0.0347 -0.0213** 0.8746*** -0.0082*** -0.0556
(0.0223) (0.0322) (0.0100) (0.0217) (0.0017) (0.0347)
DACCRi,t−1 -0.1021** 0.0042 -0.0016 -0.0081 0.0202*** 0.6140***
(0.0423) (0.0637) (0.0199) (0.0267) (0.0293) (0.0872)
EQISSUEi,t−1 -0.0021 0.0290 -0.0736*** 0.1248*** -0.0064 0.5408***
(0.0081) (0.0822) (0.0260) (0.0084) (0.0021) (0.0691)
ri,t−2 -0.0030 0.0369 0.0127 0.0729*** 0.0225*** 0.2398***
(0.0221) (0.0379) (0.0153) (0.0171) (0.0052) (0.0404)
ri,t−3 -0.0166 0.0642 0.0255 0.0547** 0.0002 0.1722***
(0.0171) (0.0494) (0.0167) (0.0203) (0.0019) (0.0152)
ri,t−4 -0.0160 0.0053 0.0098 0.0286** -0.0039 0.2392***
(0.0147) (0.0240) (0.0123) (0.0106) (0.0025) (0.0293)
ri,t−5 -0.0178 0.0571** 0.0025 0.0216* -0.0100** -0.2303***
(0.0153) (0.0270) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0036) (0.0325)
Observations 45440 45440 45440 45440 45440 45440
R-squared 0.005 0.057 0.749 0.704 0.028 0.552














































Figure 1: Histogram of the mispricing metric